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Q U E S T I O N S A N D A N S W E R S I N A 
C O N T E X T - D E P E N D E N T M O N T A G U E G R A M M A R 
A successful formal reconstruction of a fragment of a natura l language l ike 
the one presented in Montague (1973) 1 calls for extensions in various 
directions. T w o of the most chal lenging ones among them are the inc lus ion 
of non-declarative sentence moods and a treatment of context-dependency 
beyond the interpretation of tense. The present paper advances some Steps 
in both directions since we believe that deal ing w i th context-dependency is 
a prerequisite for a satisfactory treatment of interrogatives. Whi l e 
transformationalists tend to regard interrogatives in i so la t ion , 2 scholars 
interested in the semantics of natura l language, both outside the Montague 
school (e.g., Keenan and H u l l , 1973) and inside (e.g., H a m b l i n , 1973), have 
noted the relat ion that l inks up questions wi th their possible answers. 
Montague himself suggests 3 that a syntax and semantics of interrogatives 
should provide a characterizat ion of the semantic content of a correct 
answer. Whether a certain expression counts as a correct answer, however, 
depends on the context in which it is uttered. A n appropriate context has to 
conta in an utterance of a cor respond ing interrogat ive expression. 
Therefore we shall tackle the prob lem from the rear. F irst we ask: What are 
the expressions that may serve as answers when uttered in an appropriate 
context and how are they interpreted? A n d then: H o w are interrogatives to 
be analysed in order to make sure that each corresponding answer is 
assigned a correct interpretation? O u r attempt may thus be regarded as a 
first step toward a formal grammar of discourse. 
Grammar i ans usually classify interrogatives into the fo l lowing three ma in 
categories: 
0. I N T R O D U C T I O N 
1. T Y P E S O F Q U E S T I O N S A N D A N S W E R S 
(A) 
(B) 
( Q 
Yes -no questions 
Alternative questions 
WH-quest ions . 
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Category (C) may be subclassified according to what element of the 
sentence is asked for: 
(C l ) the subject 
(C2) the direct object 
(C3) a subject complement 
(C4) an object complement 
(C5) an adverbial, 
Category. (C5) comprises again a number of subcategories we shall not 
enumerate here. In the fol lowing, we shall restrict ourselves to the most 
important types, namely (A) (yes-no questions), (C l ) and (C2) (which we 
shall ca l l term questions), and those subcategories of (C5) (adverbial 
questions) that use the question words how, where, when, and why. 
Let us examine now the expressions that may serve as answers to these 
types of questions. Consider for example (1), an instance of a yes-no 
question: 
(1) Does John love M a r y ? 
W i t h respect to a context created by an utterance of (1), or, as we shall also 
say, in the context of (1), the fo l lowing expressions may be used in giv ing an 
answer: 
( la) Yes. 
( lb) He does. 
( lc) He does so. 
( ld) He loves her. 
(le) He loves M a r y . 
(10 John loves her. 
( lg) John loves M a r y . 
(1h) Yes, (lb). 
(Im) Yes, (lg). 
Neglect ing the different degrees of acceptabil ity of ( la)- ( l m )> w ^ m a Y State 
that they al l have two fealures in common: 
(i) they commit the Speaker (disregarding i rony, etc.) to the t ruth of 
(lg), and 
(ii) they supply just the in format ion required by the utterance of (1). 
This contrasts them with answers l ike (In) and (lo): 
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(In) Yes, certainly. 
( lo ) Yes, probably. 
wh i ch give more and less, respectively, Information than required and 
wh ich may therefore be called over- and under-answers, respectively. Since 
these w i l l presumably have to be analysed on the basis of exact answers, we 
feel entit led not to treat them here. 
L o o k i n g through our list of possible answers to (1) one can notice that 
there is an increase of redundancy and explicitness from (la) to (lg) and 
again from ( lh) to (Im). We may cal l therefore (la) a m in ima l or non-
redundant answer and (lg) a redundant answer. (lb)—(lf) are then partial ly 
redundant answers, and ( lh ) - ( ln i ) combine each a non-redundant answer 
w i th a (partially) redundant one. 
Regard ing the semantics of ( la) through (Im), it is clear that they are 
equivalent only wi th respect to certain contexts, namely those produced by 
an utterance of (1). If we replace (1) by (2), 
(2) Does B i l l love M a r y ? 
( la)- ( le ) and (lh)—(lk) are st i l l equivalent to each other, but not to (lf), (lg), 
(11), and (Im). The former two sti l l express the same propos i t ion as they d id 
wi th respect to the first context, but they have now a different i l locut ionary 
force insofar as they cannot count as answers anymore . 4 The latter two 
become somewhat odd in the new context. 
Th ings are very s imilar wi th respect to term questions and their answers. 
Cons ider the fol lowing examples: 
(3) W h o dates M a r y ? 
(3a) B i l l . 
(3b) B i l l does. 
(3c) B i l l does so. 
(3d) B i l l dates her. 
(3e) B i l l dates Mary . 
A g a i n we may dist inguish between a min ima l , non-redundant answer l ike 
(3a), part ia l ly redundant answers l ike (3b)-(3d) and a (fully) redundant 
answer l ike (3e). There are, however, no answers to term questions 
corresponding to the (h)-(m ) cases of example (1). 
Conce rn ing adverbial questions, the k inds of expressions that may play 
the ro le of an appropriate answer are demonstrated by the fol lowing 
example: 
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(4) When wi l l M a r y meet John? 
(4a) A t seven p.m. 
(4b) She w i l l do so at seven p.m. 
(4c) She w i l l meet h im at seven p.m. 
(4d) She w i l l meet John at seven p.m. 
(4e) M a r y w i l l do so at seven p.m. 
(4f) M a r y w i l l meet h im at seven p.m. 
(4g) M a r y wi l l meet John at seven p.m. 
Aga in , there is a scale of increasing redundancy from (4a) to (4g). A n d again 
the t ruth value of the answer expression wi l l depend on the question in the 
context of wh ich it is uttered, except for (4g). In this respect (4g) behaves l ike 
(3e) and (lg). Th is shows that redundant answers are not very interesting 
from a semantical point of view since their semantic representation is 
identical to that of ord inary declarative sentences. In fact, they are ordinary 
declarative sentences and the question wi th respect to which they are 
interpreted determines only the i l locut ionary force that they carry. The ir 
answerhood depends on the relation between their intension and that of the 
question expression, and both can be established independently. The 
Situation is different, as we have seen, w i th the other k inds of answers, where 
not only the i l locut ionary force depends on the meaning of the question 
expression but also the respective meaning the answer expression has. Since 
both, redundant and non-redundant answers are possible, and since non-
redundant answers are generally much more natural , we ho ld that no 
serious theory of questions and answers should restrict itself to a treatment 
of redundant answers alone, and that it should be able to handle both. As 
shown above, redundant answers represent no prob lem wi th respect to 
semantic interpretation; the problems they pose concern only the theory of 
speech acts. The remaining answer-types, on the other hand, do present 
interest ing problems concern ing semantic interpretat ion. We may 
dist inguish between the (a)-cases, which we called m in ima l answers, and the 
remaining ones, which share the feature of conta in ing one or more unbound 
or exophoric pro-forms. But the problem of exophoric pro-forms is not 
l imited to answer-expressions alone, it may be viewed as an instance of the 
general prob lem of determinirig the reference for pro-forms. We shall not go 
deeper into this matter here (cf. Hausser, 1977), but it seems that once this 
problem is solved, al l part ial ly redundant answers may be reduced to 
redundant ones. Therefore it is the phenomenon of m in ima l answers that 
represents the basic and crucia l problem to be solved by a semantic theory 
of questions and answers. A f inal look at alternative questions and their 
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answers may demonstrate now our reason for neglecting them in this 
context. Consider (5)-(5f) : 
(5) Does M a r y sleep or is J ohn sick? 
(5a) M a r y sleeps. 
(5b) John is sick. 
(5c) The former. 
(5d) The latter. 
(5e) Yes. 
(5f) N o . 
The example shows that with respect to alternative questions, only 
redundant answers (5a, b) or answers wi th exophoric proforms (5c, d) are 
possible, but not m in ima l answers of the yes-no type. 
2. E X T E N D I N G T H E P T Q - L O G I C I N T O 
A C O N T E X T - D E P E N D E N T S Y S T E M 
Whi l e the fragment of Engl ish presented in 'Eng l i sh as a formal language' 
(Montague, 1974, Chapter 6) is given a direct semantic interpretation, the 
fragments contained in 'Universa l g rammar ' (Montague, 1974, Chapter 7) 
and in P T Q are (for the sake of perspicuity) interpreted indirectly v ia 
auxi l iary languages of typed intensional logic. The 'p ragmat ic ' 5 aspect of 
the no t ion of truth defined in P T Q lies in the fact that it is made relative not 
only to a given model or interpretation, as usual in mode l theoretical 
semantics, but also to a so-called point of reference </,;>, consisting of a 
possible wor id and a moment of time. Th is wi l l not suffice, however, for the 
interpretat ion of m in ima l answers, since, as we have pointed out in the 
preceding section, their truth value depends on the meaning of a previously 
uttered interrogative expression. Therefore we have to extend the P T Q -
logic into a context-dependent System which specifies for each point of 
reference the meaning of the preceding utterance. We cou ld do that, 
fo l lowing a Suggestion by D . Lewis (1970), by s imply adding a further 
coordinate, a 'previous discourse coordinate\ to the point of reference, but 
this approach would be exposed to M . J . CressweH's objection that it leads 
to an inf lat ion of coordinates: "why not a country, cl imate, rel igion, or 
'previous dr inks ' coordinate?" (Cresswell, 1973, p. 111). We therefore prefer 
another way of extending the P T Q - l o g i c 6 which comprises the fol lowing 
three steps. 
F irst we replace the interpretation or intensional model by a context-
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m o d e l We define a c o n t e x t - m o d e l as an ordered triple <<s/, C, c a } , where jrf 
is an interpretation having the form ( A , I , J , ^ , F> and being defined as in 
P T Q (p. 258), C is the set of contexts, and ca is a function from I x j into C 
('ca' Stands for 'context-assignment function'). C in turn is defined as 
{ c 0 } u ( J M£ f l , where M E a or the set of meaningful expressions of type a 
aeType 
is defined as i n P T Q (p. 256f.) and c0 Stands for the empty context, i.e., a 
context without previous discourse. (We could , of course, give C a much 
more complex structure in order to account for other phenomena than 
immediate previous-discourse dependency, but the simple formulat ion 
given here wi l l be sufficient for the restricted aims of this paper.) 
The second step pf our extension of the P T Q - l o g i c introduces a new set of 
basic symbols, namely the union of the sets C - V a r a (a e Type) or the set of 
c o n t e x t - v a r i a b l e s . If n is any natura l number and a G Type, then c - v n a is the 
nth context-variable of type a. These addi t ional basic expressions permit us 
to define a larger set of meaningful expressions for each type a, wh ich we cal l 
M E ' a . The definition of M E ' a runs l ike that of M E a (p. 256f.) w i th the 
fol lowing two differences: 
(i) The first clause of the definition is replaced by (1'): 
( V ) Every variable, constant, and context-variable of type a is in 
M E ' a . 
(ii) In the remaining clauses, each occurrence of 'M£ f l ' is replaced by * M E ' a \ 
It follows that M E a is a proper subset o f M E ' a and that ME'^ME« consists 
of those meaningful expressions which conta in at least one context-
variable. It may be cal led the set of context-dependent meaningful 
expressions. 
In the th i rd step of our extension, the respective definitions for extension 
and intension of a meaningful expression are now adjusted to M E ' a . Let i f 
be a context-model having the form < J ^ , C, c a } . Suppose further that g is an 
j/-assignment as defined in P T Q (p. 258). If a e M E ' a and </,)> e / x J , then 
a # , i j , g j s t 0 5g t r i e e x t e n s i o n of a wi th respect to i f , i j , and g, where a ^ i J ' 9 
is defined as follows: 
(1) If a is a constant, then O L * ' L J - 9 is F ( a ) « i , y » . 
(2) If a is a variable, then a y ' ' , ' 7 , 9 is g(oc). 
(3) If a G C - V a r a , then a * ' - * ' is [ca(<*,y>)]^'*<^, in case 
c a ( 0 > j ) ) e M E a , and o c ^ i J ' 9 is u eise (u Stands for undefined). 
The fo l lowing clauses (4)—(11) are systematic modif ications of the clauses 
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(3)-(10) in P T Q , p. 258f. ( including Thomason 's amendments in fn. 10 on 
p. 259). We obta in our modif ied clauses from the corresponding or ig inal 
ones by (i) replacing each occurrence of ' M £ ' by ' M E " , (ii) replacing each 
superscript r/< iJ>9 or by W J J * 9 o r r j j . g ' ^ respectively, and (iii) adding 
' in case ( x r j J , 9 y ßy'<iJ>9 are not w, and y ^ i J < 9 is u eise1, where a, /?, and y are 
the meaningful expressions mentioned in the antecedens and consequens, 
respectively. If 0 e M E \ , then </> is an i n t e r p r e t a b l e f o r m u l a wi th respect to 
<£, i , and j if and only if </>ri ^ is not u. If $ is an interpretable formula wi th 
respect to i f , /, and y, then 0 is t r u e wi th respect to that context-model and 
point of reference if and only if 0 y ' , , J ^ is 1 for every j?/-assignment g . The 
i n t e n s i o n a y , s of a relative to and g is then defined as that function h wi th 
d o m a i n I x J such that whenever ( i j } e I x J , h ( { i j } ) = a ^ l \ j ' 9 , in case 
a 7 ' 1 ' ^ is not u, and a ' ^ 9 is w eise. 
The fact that our System al lows for the case that the extension of a 
meaningful expression is undefined has obviously somewhat tedious 
technical consequences and calls for a justi f ication. We included this feature 
in order to account for the fact that a m in ima l answer is interpretable only 
with respect to an appropriate context, i.e., a context bui l t up by a suitable 
quest ion. In part icular, a l l m in ima l answers are uninterpretable wi th 
respect to the empty context c 0 . 
3. T E R M Q U E S T I O N S A N D T H E I R M I N I M A L A N S W E R S 
As we have demonstrated in Section 1, the min ima l answer to a term 
quest ion consists in an utterance of a term phrase. Cons ider the fo l lowing 
example: 
(6) What does M a r y imagine? 
(6a) A dragon . 8 
But we have stated also that an expression l ike (6a), when uttered in a 
context l ike (6), denotes a truth value. It is true exactly in case M a r y does 
imagine a dragon and false if she does not. H o w can these observations be 
combined in a formally consistent way? Note that there is a small but 
important difference between the term 'a dragon ' and the expression (6a): 
The latter ends wi th a füll stop, which indicates a fall ing tone and makes the 
utterance count as a declarative one. We shall therefore assign expressions 
l ike (6a) the category t (declarative sentence), and translate them into 
expressions of type t (formulas). Since the intension of (6a) depends partly 
on the intension of the term k a dragon ' and partly on the context, we have to 
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translate it, according to the principle of composit ional i ty , into a context-
dependent meaningful expression conta in ing the translat ion of 4 a dragon\ 
The simplest way of do ing this is adding a context-variable of Att ing type to 
the intensionalized term-translation. We translate thus the m in ima l answer 
(6a) into (6a'): 
(6a') T ( P V x [dragon'(x) A P {X } ] ) . 
Assuming that T is a context-variable of type « s , / ( T ) > , f >, (6a') as a whole 
turns out to be an element of M E ' V as desired. It is easy to State now the 
properties an appropriate translat ion (6') of (6) has to show: F irst , it has to 
be of the same type as T, and second, if (7') is the translat ion of the 
redundant answer (7), 
(7) M a r y imagines a dragon 
then the extension of (6a') wi th respect to a context-model and a point of 
reference such that c a { ( i j ) ) is (6') has to be the same as the extension of (7') 
with respect to that model and point of reference. In other words, m in ima l 
and redundant answers have to be equivalent with respect to the same 
question. We meet this requirement formally on the basis of the pr inc ip le of 
functional appl icat ion by abstracting a function from,an appropr iate open 
formula such that it may be applied to arguments like that of T in (6a'). Thus 
a translation of (6) would be (6'): 
(6') .#m*0magine'(.^)). 
Accord ing to clause (3) of our definit ion, the extension of (6a') w i th respect 
to a context-model and a point of reference of the k ind specified above, is 
the same as that of (6a"): 
(6a") .#m*f imagine ' (^ )y (P V x[dragon' (x) A P { X } ] ) . 
Accord ing to some val id PTQ-pr inc ip les , (6a") is equivalent w i th (6a'"): 
(6a'") m*Omag ine ' ( P V x[dragon' (x) A P {X } ] ) ) . 
This, in turn, is exactly the result of translat ing (7), which shows that the 
desired equivalence of m in ima l and redundant answer is met. So far we have 
been loosely speaking of the translation of, e.g., (7). This is not quite correct, 
however, since there are two semantically different translations of (7), 
usually referred to as its referential and non-referential reading. Above we 
havfc treated only the latter one. It is not difficult, however, to derive the 
referential reading of (6a) as well: 
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( 6 b) F i o . o ( a dragon,he 0 . ) 
(6b) is surface-identical with (6a), but it translates differently: 
(6b') P V x[dragon' (x ) A P { x } ] ( x o r ( P P { x 0 } ) ) . 
After some reformulations we get: 
(6b") P V x [dragon'(x) A P { X } ] (x 0m*Omagine / (PP{x 0 } ) ) ) ? 
which is the result of translat ing the referential reading of (7). 
There are, however, some phenomena our analysis doesn't account for 
yet. Consider for example (8) and (8a): 
(8) W h o m does M a r y kiss? 
(8a) A fish. 
(8a) is not uninterpretable wi th respect to the context created by (8), but it 
does not give the informat ion required. (8) doesn't just ask for any object of 
Mary ' s kissing but for a human one. As fishes never are human, (8a) is an 
impl ic i t ly contradictory and hence always false answer wi th respect to (8). 
W i t h respect to (9), on the other hand, 
(9) What does M a r y kiss? 
(8a) might well be a true answer (provided M a r y is a little queer). The 
fo l lowing two steps are necessary in order to handle these facts adequately: 
We have to assign different translations to what and w h o ( m ) on the basis of 
the features human and n o t h u m a n , respectively, and we have to add two 
meaning postulates ensuring that in al l possible worlds and at any moment 
of time, e.g., J ohn is a human and a fish is no t . 9 
Next consider (10)—(1 la) : 
(10) W h o m wi l l B i l l meet? 
(11) Wh i ch gir l w i l l B i l l meet? 
(IIa) The drum-major . 
Whi l e (1 la) may be a true answer to (10) as well as to (11), the condit ions for 
its being true are not the same in both cases. Suppose the drum-major is a 
man. Then (1 la) may be true with respect to (10), but never wi th respect to 
(11), since in the latter context, but not in the former, (IIa) implies that the 
drum-major is a g i r l . 1 0 O u r analysis of which-questions wi l l have to 
account for this fact. 
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F ina l l y consider (12)—(13a): 
(12) W h o sleeps? 
(13) What does John eat? 
(12a) Nobody . 
(13a) No th ing . 
The fact that (12a) becomes nonsensical in the context of (13) and that the 
same holds for (13a) with respect to (12) shows again the effects of the 
semantic difference between what and who. Note , however, the complete 
naturalness of (12a) wi th respect to (12) and of (13a) wi th respect to (13), 
wh ich suggests that what and who questions do not presuppose the 
existence of a thing or person having the specified property. Therefore we 
translate who and what without existential quantifier. The data seem to be a 
l itt le less convinc ing regarding which questions but we believe that (14), 
(14a) is also a natural question-answer p a i r : 1 1 
(14) Wh i ch man wi l l M a r y kiss? 
(14a) N o one. 
Hence we propose to regard the existence of some man w h o m M a r y w i l l 
kiss as an invited inference rather than a logically va l id o n e 1 2 and we 
introduce no existential quantifier into the translat ion of which neither. 
A s a k i n d of summary of our investigations in this section, we shall give 
now translations for several of our examples according to the rules stated in 
the appendix. (\n/my Stands for \n) in the context of (m)\) 
(9) What does M a r y kiss? 
(9') # 1 m * r k i s s ' ( P ^ 1 { x [ - i h u m a n ' ( x ) A P {X } ] } ) ) . 
(8a) A fish. 
(8a') T ( P V x[fish'(x) A P{x}]). 
(8a'/9') V w[fish' (u) A k i s s ' ^m, M)] . 
(10) W h o m wi l l B i l l mee*t? 
(10') # 1 H / f e * f m e e t ' ( P ^ 1 { x [ h u m a n ' ( x ) A P {X } ] } ) ) . 
(11) W h i c h gir l w i l l B i l l meet? 
(11') & l W b * ( m t t \ \ P & l { x \ & T \ ' ( x ) A P {X } ] } ) ) . 
(IIa) The drum-major. 
(IIa') T ( P V y [ A x[drum-major'(x)<-+x = y] A P { X } ] ) . 
( l la'/10') 
W V v [ A w[drum-major'^(w)«->w==i;] A meet'^fc, y)] 
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( l l a ' / l l ' ) 
W V v i A w[drum-major'+(«)<->w = y] A gir l '^u) 
A meet' ( b , v)~\. 
(12) W h o sle*eps? 
(12') P » x {x[human'(x) A P{x}] } fsleep') 
(12a) Nobody . 
(12a') T ( P - i V x[human' (x ) A P { X } ] ) 
(12a'/12') 
- i V u[human'*(w) A sleep'^(w)] 
(13) What does John eat? 
(13') ^ y ^ e a t ^ P ^ { x [ - i human'(x) A P { X } ] } ) ) 
(13a) No th ing . 
(13a') T ( P - i V x [ - i human'(x) A P { X } ] ) 
(13a'/13') 
- i V human'^w) A ea t ' ^ j , u)~\ 
4. Y E S - N O Q U E S T I O N S A N D T H E I R 
M I N I M A L A N S W E R S 
The analysis of yes-no questions seems to be very simple. The set of 
m in ima l answer expressions contains just those two members which gave 
the whole category its name. The interrogative expressions themselves are 
derivable from ordinary declarative sentences in a rather simple way. Th is 
coincides with the fact that they do not conta in characteristic question 
words. There are, however, some particularit ies to be accounted for. F irst 
compare (15), (16), and (15a): 
(15) W i l l John leave? 
(16) Won ' t J ohn leave? 
(15a) N o . 
What are the condit ions for (15a) to be true? W i t h respect to (15), (15a) is 
true just in case John wi l l not leave. The same holds, however, with respect 
to (16). It follows that the negative form in (16) is not a truth functional 
component of the whole expression. It rather has the function of an 
att i tudinal disjunct, tel l ing us something about the expectation the Speaker 
had: " O h , I thought he wou ld . " wou ld be a natura l cont inuat ion. 
Secondly, consider (17) and (17a): 
(17) W i l l M a r y talk or does the dragon sleep? 
(17a) Yes. 
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It is very improbable that (17a) wi l l serve as a natural answer to (17). This is 
due to the fact that (17) can hardly be anything eise than an alternative 
quest ion. Compare , however, (18): 
(18) Does B i l l d r ink or smoke? 
Here the alternative as well as the yes-no reading are possible and therefore 
(17a) is a possible answer to (18). 
W e account for these facts by der iv ing yes-no interrogatives not from 
declarative sentences, but from terms and intransitive verb phrases, 
exc luding thus negation and sentential conjunct ion and disjunction. 
The further requirements an adequate analysis of yes-no questions and 
their m in ima l answers must meet are quite obvious: If is a yes-no 
interrogative and $ is the corresponding declarative sentence, then the 
extension of Yes. wi th respect to 0? has to be truth exactly in case the 
extension of </> is truth and the extension of N o . wi th respect to </>? has to be 
t ru th if and only if </> is not true. The fo l lowing translations have the desired 
properties: p [ p ] (for yes) and p[~~Tp] (for n o ) denote complementary sets of 
proposit ions. T(p[p] ) (representing Yes.) and T^ -T/? ] ) (representing N o . ) 
denote truth values, provided the context-variable V denotes sets of 
properties of proposit ions. The context-variable Stands again for the 
translat ion of an appropriate question, e.g., (15): 
(15') ^ f ^ r O e a v e ' ) } . 
(15a') r ( p [ i > ] ) . 
If we interpret (15a') wi th respect to (15'), we may read it roughly as follows: 
The set of properties of the proposi t ion that John wi l l leave contains the 
property of not being the case. The reduct ion shows the desired equivalence 
wi th the redundant answer (19): 
(19) John won't leave. 
(19') - i W leave' ( j ) 
(15a'/15') 
- i W leave' (j) 
5. A D V E R B I A L Q U E S T I O N S A N D T H E I R 
M I N I M A L A N S W E R S 
O u r general approach works for adverbial questions as well as for term and 
yes-no questions. We shall therefore restrict our discussion to two special 
points. F irst it is obvious that an adverbial question determines not only the 
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syntactic category of the expression which, together wi th the füll stop, 
makes up a min ima l answer, but also part of its semantic content. The 
fo l lowing examples may serve as an i l lustrat ion: 
(20) H o w does B i l l walk? 
(20a) Rapid ly . 
(20b) Slowly. 
(20c) A t seven p.m. 
(20d) A t the corner. 
(20e) Into the park. 
(20f) Because of M a r y . 
O n l y (20a) and (20b) make sense in the context of (20), (20c)-(20f) don't. The 
data are s imi lar to those which concern the difference between w h a t , w h o , 
and which plus a c o m m o n noun phrase, and therefore we account for them 
in an analogous way: We introduce a feature into the translat ion of the 
adverbia l question word (e.g., M A N N E R in the case of how — we use upper 
case letters in order to avo id confusion wi th the c o m m o n noun translat ion 
m a n n e r ' ) and we ensure by a meaning postulate that this feature turns out to 
be redundant if the answer is suitable. But there is another phenomenon to 
be noticed which has no counterpart among the term questions. Compare 
(21), (22), and the answers (21a)-(22a): 
(21) Where does John walk? 
(22) Where wi l l J ohn meet the blonde? 
(21a) In the park. 
(21b) Into the park. 
(22a) A t the party. 
(21a)-(22a) do a l l make sense in the context of (21), but only (21a) and (22a) 
do so in the context of (22). The consequence is clear: (21) has to be assigned 
two readings, due to the lexical ambiguity of the question word where. The 
fo l lowing translations, derived according to the rules stated in the 
Append ix , show our proposal for deal ing wi th that phenomenon: 
(21') > U ^ * f A P x C P L A C E ^ ) A a v { x , P} ] fwalk' ) ) . 
(21") Xa 1 j*(kPx[DIRECTIONSJ) A a x { x , P} ] fwalk' ) ) . 
U s i n g MP (14 ) and MP (15 ) (cf. the appendix, 8.4) we get the fo l lowing 
translat ions for (21a) and (21b) in the context of the place- and the d irect ion-
reading of (21), respectively: 
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(21a'/21') 
in 'O'/walk ' , P V y [ A u [park ' ( K ) « - * K = I?] A 
(21b'/21") 
into'O,^walk' , P V t ' [ A « [ p a r k ' ^ w ) « - ^ * ; ] A P{y}]). 
Aga in , we have equivalence wi th the redundant answers (23) and (24): 
(23) J ohn walks in the park. 
(24) John walks into the park. 
6. M U L T I P L E Q U E S T I O N S 
Thus far we have been considering only questions that ask for one and only 
one item. W i t h respect to them, a min ima l answer consists in the declarative 
utterance of one expression of the corresponding category. There are, 
however, interrogative sentences l ike (25) which ask for more than one item: 
(25) W h o kisses whom? 
A suitable m in ima l answer is, e.g., (25a): 
(25a) M a r y B i l l . 
We may call questions l ike (25) two-term questions. A somewhat different 
example is the fol lowing: 
(26) When wi l l J ohn meet M a r y where? 
(26a) A t seven p.m. at the corner. 
Questions of this k i n d may be called two-adverbial questions. But the items 
asked for in a mult iple question need not be of the same category, as the 
fol lowing example demonstrates: 
(27) W h o seeks the dragon where? 
(27a) M a r y in the park. 
Note , however, that the degree of acceptabil ity of the question and 
especially of the min ima l answer diminishes as the number of questioned 
items increases: 
(28) W h o kisses whom where when how? 
(28a) M a r y B i l l at the corner in the evening rapidly. 
But since, apart from acceptability, there is no pr incipled reason against a 
question-answer pair l ike (28), (28a), our rules account also for cases l ike 
this. 
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The Situation is different wi th expressions l ike the fo l lowing: 
(29) *Does J o h n leave when? 
(29a) *Yes in the evening. 
The reason for rejecting (29) is not a low degree of acceptabil ity but sheer 
ungrammatical i ty : A yes-no question cannot conta in any addi t ional 
questioned item. We therefore restrict the possibi l i ty of generating mult iple 
questions to term and adverbial questions (cf. rule S19.(d) in the Appendix) . 
7. C O N C L U D I N G R E M A R K S 
In conc lus ion we shall point out briefly some of the most important respects 
in which our approach differs from other recent proposals concerning the 
formal semantics of questions. We differ from Keenan and H u l l (1973) 
mainly in three points: (a) We provide explicit and separate rules for 
translat ing question and answer expressions from natural into logical 
language, (b) we do not restrict ourselves to which and yes-no questions, 
and (c) we do not exclude answers of the nobody/nothing type from the 
class of natural answers. We differ from H a m b l i n (1973) in that our 
approach does not make it necessary to 'lift ' the whole semantics in type, 
letting, e.g., the intension of a formula be the unit set of a proposi t ion 
instead of the propos i t ion itself. Wh i l e H a m b l i n proposes to let questions 
denote uni formly sets of proposit ions, we propose to let questions denote 
different types of sets according to the type of that expression which is the 
cr i t ica l one in any k i n d of answer. F ina l l y , in contrast to Karttunen(1976), 
we do not believe that an adequate analysis of direct questions can be given 
by supplementing a grammar of embedded questions wi th the remark that 
direct questions can be derived from a deleted performative 4I ask you to teil 
me' plus the corresponding embedded questions. Apar t from other 
problems concerning the performative analysis we see no way such a 
proposal cou ld be amended in order to account for the phenomenon of 
m in ima l answers which we showed to be the cruc ia l semantic problem in 
connect ion with direct questions. 
8. A P P E N D I X 
A n e x t e n s i o n of the P T Q - j r a g m e n t of E n g l i s h i n c l u d i n g d i r e c t q u e s t i o n s and 
m i n i m a l answers 
8.1. A d d i t i o n a l c a t e g o r i e s 
(a) C a t e g o r i e s f o r d i r e c t q u e s t i o n s 
t/(t//t) is the category of direct yes-no questions. 
354 R O L A N D H A U S S E R A N D D I E T M A R Z A E F F E R E R 
t / T is the category of direct one-term questions. 
t / I A V is the category of direct one-adverbial questions. 
If A , B e { T , I A V ) , then (... { t / A ) / . . .)/B are the categories of direct 
mult ip le questions, in part icular 
( t / T ) / T is the category of direct two-term questions, and 
( t / I A V y i A V is the category of direct two-adverbial questions. 
(b) F r i m e d c a t e g o r i e s 
If A is a category, then ( A ) f is also a category (parentheses wi l l be omitted if 
no ambiguity can arise). In part icular, t' is the category of open sentences. 
8.2. A d d i t i o n a l b a s i c e x p r e s s i o n s 
ß / v , = B , J Q u {sleep, leave} 
B T = B l j l Q u {seven p.m., nobody, nothing} 
B T , = {who, what} 
B T V = B ^ ] P u {meet, kiss, imagine} 
B I A V , = { h o w , when, w h e r e p where 2 , why} 
ß C N = ß ^ Q u {blonde, g ir l , drum-major, human, dragon, evening, corner, 
party} 
BiAv/T = BfiAv/T u { i n t 0> a t> because of} 
ß,//r = {yes, no}. 
8.3. A d d i t i o n a l S- and T - r u l e s 
Let s be an addi t ional distinct member of C o n e , M A N N E R , T I M E , P L A C E , 
D I R E C T I O N , and R E A S O N be part icular distinct members of 
C o n « ^ ; ^ » , , ) , and a be the variable v Q ^ S J { 1 A V ) y 
(a) B a s i c rules 
T1 .(d)' J o h n , M a r y , B i l l , n i n e t y , seven p . m . translate into j * , m* , b * , n * , s* 
respectively. 
(f) n o b o d y and n o t h i n g translate into P ~ ) V x[human' (x ) A P{.x}] 
and P ~ i Vx [—ihuman' (x ) A P{x}] respectively. 
(g) who and what translate into P^ {x [human ' (x ) A P (x } ] j and 
P ^ { x [ n h u m a n ' ( x ) A P{x}]} respectively. 
(h) h o w , when, w h e r e { , w h e r e 2 , why translate into 
k P x [ M A N N E R ( a ) A ,/{x, P}], k P x [ T I M E ( a ) A a \ x , P} ] , 
k P x [ P L A C E { a ) A «{x, P } ] , k P x [ D I R E C T I O N 
( a ) A a { x , P}] , 
k P x [ R E A S O N ( a ) A *{x, P}] respectively. 
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(i) y e s , n o translate into p [ p] , p [ - T p ] respectively. 
S2a. If c e PCN, then F 2 a(^) e P 7 - , where F 2 a ( c ) = w h i c h 
T2a . If € P C N and ^ translates into then F 2 a ( Q translates into 
P ^ ( X [ C ' ( X ) A P { X } ] } . 
(b) R u l e s of f u n c t i o n a l a p p l i c a t i o n 
S4.-S10. apply to norma l categories as well as to their pr imed variants. If 
one of the input expressions is of a pr imed category, the category of the 
O u t p u t expression has to be replaced by its pr imed variant. 
S5'. If S e PIVIT and ß e P R , then F5(ö, ß) e Plv, where F5(ö, ß) = 5ß 
if ß does not have the form h e n or who and F5(ö, h e n ) = 6 h i m n and 
F5(ö, w h o ) = S w h o m . 
(c) F o r m a t i o n r u l e s f o r d i r e c t q u e s t i o n s 
(Since our ma in concern here is not syntax and for the sake of brevity we 
give only a rough outl ine of rule S19, an explicit Statement of which would 
require the definition of several auxi l iary notions.) 
518. If < x e P T and öePIV, then F16(a,<5), F 1 7 (a,(S), F 1 8 ( a , 6 ) e Pr, 
F i 6(a> <5)= w h e t h e r a d ' , Fl 7 (a, S) = w h e t h e r OLÖ", F X 8 (a, ö) 
= w h e t h e r ad'", and ö', ö", ö'" come from ö by replacing the first 
verb in ö by its third person singular present, future, or present 
perfect, respectively. 
T18. If a e Pr, ö e PiV, and a, ö translate into a', 6' respectively, then 
F i6 ( a > <5) translates into q { ~ a ' ( d ' ) } , 
F 1 7 ( a , 8) translates into q{~Wa'{ö')}, 
F 1 8 ( a , ö) translates into q{~Ha'Cö')}. 
q is to be the variable i>o,<s./<!//oy 
519. If 4 > e P t ' and a, a',...,ß, /? ' , . . . are the first, second, . . . 
members of P R and P I A V > respectively that occur in <j>, then 
either: 
(a) there is no such a or ß and F 1 9 ( $ ) e P,/<,//R>, F19(</>) = $\ v , 
where comes from </> by first replacing the first verb in <j> 
by its do-supported form (the do-supported form of is being 
is, of course, etc.) and then substitut ing the auxi l iary for the 
ini t ia l w h e t h e r ; or 
(b) there is exactly one a e P T > as required and F20(</>) e Pt/T, 
where either a = w h o and F 2 0 ( </>) = </>?, or a = w h o m and 
F 2 0 ( < l ) ) = w h o m </>' ?, where (j)' comes from <fi by deleting 
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whom in (/>, replacing the first verb in <j> by its do-
supported form, and preposing the auxi l iary; or 
(c) there is exactly one ßePlAV. as required and 
F 2 i ( ( t > ) G Pt/iAv* F2i(<t>)=ß<t>' ?» where 4>* comes from, </> by 
deleting ß in <£, replacing the first verb in </> by its do-
supported form, and preposing the auxi l iary; or 
(d) there are n ( n > 1) a or ß as required and 
F i 2 , n ( < l > ) ^ P i . . , t / A y . . . y ^ B € { T 9 1 A V } \ F22,„(</>) = </>?. 
T19. If (j) e P,., (j) translates into </>', and a 1 , . . . , a n , in that order, are 
the free occurrences, from left to right, of variables in (/>', then 
Fi9(</>)> F 2 o ( < t > l F2i(<W> a n d F22,«(</>) translate into 
/i.vl ... l v n 4 > " y where v - { i ^ i ^ r i ) is the i-th variable of the same 
type as a' and 0" comes from $ ' by replacing each a' in </>' by 
the i-th variable of the same type. 
(d) F o r m a t i o n r u l e s f o r m i n i m a l answers 
S20a. If A e {t//t, T , I A V ] and a e PA9 then F 2 3 ( a ) e P „ where F 2 3 ( a ) 
= a . . 
T20a. If a e PA ( A G {*//*, T, 7/1K}) and <x translates into a', then 
F 2 3 ( a ) translates into T (V ) . 
T is to be the context-variable c-v0 < <s / M ) > f >. 
S20b. If a Ä € P A l , . . . , <x„ e P ^ (y*f G {T, I A V } 9 1 ^ K n ) , then 
F 2 4 i i l ( a 1 , . . . , a j e P f and 
F 2 4 a„) = a x . . . a „ . . 
T20b. If a ^ P ^ a „ 6 P ^ ( A ( G { F , I A V } , l ^ i ^ n ) , and 
a l s . . . , a„ translate into a / , . . . , a„' respectively, then 
F 2 4 w ( a p . . . , a„) translates into 
A / l i ^„fO- • -Cai')» where A / l i i s the context-variable 
C _ l ; 0 . < <... <s,/U,) >,... >, < <s,/M„) >.i > >' 
8.4. A d d i t i o n a l m e a n i n g p o s t u l a t e s 
(10) • afhuman' ) , where a i s m * , £>*, or Fn{£) (O^n^2), and { 
translates mein, w o m a n , b l o n d e , or gir/. 
(11) • a f i h u m a n ' ) , where a is n * , s*, or F w(£) ( 0 ^ w ^ 2 ) , and € 
translates any member of B C N except human and those 
mentioned in MP(10) . 
(12) • MANNER f<5 ) , where <5 translates r a p i d l y or s l o w l y . 
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(13) • TIMEf<5), where 6 translates i n t h e e v e n i n g or a t s e v e n p . m . . 
(14) • P L A C E f 5 f where 8 translates i n or a t and ß is F„(£) (0 
^ n ^  2), where £ translates p#r/c, corner, or party. 
(15) • D I R E C T I O N f d f / ? ) ) , where S translates i n t o and ß 
translates any member of PT except n i n e t y , s e v e n p . m . , 
Fn(price), or F n ( t e m p e r a t u r e ) ( 0 ^ n ^ 2 ) . 
(16) • REASONf<$(/?)), where <5 translates b e c a u s e o f and ß 
translates any member of P r except n i n e t y and s e v e n p . m . . 
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N O T E S 
The present paper developed out of many discussions the authors had with each other as well 
as with many colleagues. For commenting on and criticizing earlier versions of this paper we 
are indebted especially to Max Cresswell, Edward Keenan, Godehard Link, Richmond 
Thofnason, Theo Vennemann, and the members of his seminar on problems of the theory of 
grammar in the summer of 1976. Remaining shortcomings and mistakes are, of course, entirely 
our own. 
1 T h e proper treatment of quantification in ordinary English\ henceforth abbreviated as 
PTQ. This article has been reprinted as Chapter 8 of Montague (1974), to which we refer. 
2 Cf., e.g., Bach (1970). 
3 P T Q , p. 248, fn. 3. 
4 According to one view, answers constitute an illocutionary type (a subcategory of 
assertions) since they may be defined in terms of the specific change in the interactional 
Situation they produce: They fulfill the commitment established by the previous question and 
they commit the Speaker to the truth of their propositional content. 
5 Like Hamblin (1973, p. 47) we do not accept Montague's identifying 'pragmatics' with 
indexical semantics'. The central problems of pragmatics, as we understand this notion, are 
those of a theory of Speech acts. For an analysis of the speech acts of asking a question see 
Zaefferer (in preparation). 
6 The basic idea of this approach has been outlined in Chapter 5 of Hausser (1974). 
7 As usual we understand by A\B, A and B being any sets, the complement of the intersection 
of A and B with respect to A . 
8 We apologize for being fed up a little with unicorns. 
9 Remember that P T Q treats proper names as rigid designators, i.e., as referring to the same 
individual at all points of reference. Therefore, if B i l l j n . refers to a steamboat, B i l l j n . is 
necessarily non-human. 
1 0 This fact has been pointed out also by Keenan and Hul l (1973, p. 448f.). 
1 1 In this respect we subscribe to Marga Reis' critique of Keenan and Hul l (1973) in Reis 
(1974), fn. 17. 
1 2 For the notion of an invited inference see Geis and Zwicky (1971). 
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